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Abstract: In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide 
a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they 
offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The 
adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. 
The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of 
mental time travel that allows us not only to go back in time but also to foresee, plan, and shape 
virtually any specific future event. We review comparative studies and find that, in spite of 
increased research in the area, there is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in 
nonhuman animals. We submit that mental time travel is not an encapsulated cognitive system, 
but instead comprises several subsidiary mechanisms. A theater metaphor serves as an analogy 
for the kind of mechanisms required for effective mental time travel. We propose that future 
research should consider these mechanisms in addition to direct evidence of future-directed 
action. We maintain that the emergence of mental time travel in evolution was a crucial step 
toward our current success. 
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He said “What’s time? Now is for dogs and apes! Man has Forever!” 
—Robert Browning, A Grammarian’s Funeral 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Time travel may never be physically possible (Holden 2005). For now at least, humans can travel 
in time only in their minds. Mental time travel is a term we coined to refer to the faculty that 
allows humans to mentally project themselves backward in time to relive, or forward to prelive, 
events (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). Past and future travels share phenomenological 
characteristics and activate similar parts of the brain. Mentally reliving past events is also known 
as episodic memory in the literature and has been the topic of intense research efforts (e.g., 
Tulving 1984; 2005). By contrast, mental construction of potential future episodes has only very 
recently begun to draw attention. Nevertheless, there is growing recognition that mental time 
travel into the past and future are related, and that the ultimate evolutionary advantage must lie 
with the capacity to access the future (Dudai & Carruthers 2005; Suddendorf & Busby 2003; 
2005; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997; Tulving 2005). Though we may often get it wrong, humans 
have in general been extraordinarily successful in foreseeing, planning, and shaping the future, 
and indeed allowing us to influence the earth itself in extraordinary but not always benevolent 
ways (Dawkins 2000). 
 
Since present behavior can increase or decrease an individual’s future survival chances, one 
might expect many species to have evolved anticipatory capacities. The world is dynamic, and 
organisms that can pick up on significant regularities (e.g., fluctuations in food availability) and 
act in tune with them (e.g., being in the right place at the right time) have an advantage over 
those that do not. Many organisms actively influence their own futures by creating an 
environment that suits their needs (so-called niche-construction, Odling-Smee et al. 2003), such 
as when a beaver dams a stream. However, future-oriented mechanisms vary in flexibility, and 
relatively inflexible mechanisms will often suffice. 
 
Through natural selection, some species have evolved behavioral predispositions to exploit 
significant long-term regularities (e.g., seasonal variations). A hibernator, for example, may 
hoard food for an impending winter even if individually it has never experienced a winter. Such 
instinctual future-directed behavior serves well, as long as the environmental pattern persists. 
But even long-term regularities may at times change drastically (e.g., climate change), and 
organisms fixed to a pattern that no longer prevails are disadvantaged relative to those that have 
more flexibility. This can be achieved by individual fine-tuning mechanisms, such as critical 
periods for parameter setting, imprinting, and other forms of learning. Indeed, learning and 
memory in general may be regarded as future-oriented adaptations that allow an individual, 
rather than a population, to adjust to local change and track short-term regularities. 
 
Here we propose a taxonomy of how memory systems differ in what they provide for the future. 
We argue that mental time travel is the most flexible of those memory-based systems, and the 
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most recently evolved. We then review evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals, 
and suggest a framework that identifies subsidiary mechanisms of mental time travel that 
nonhuman species may or may not possess. 
 
First, though, it is useful to distinguish perceptual systems that detect and track relevant 
information from action systems that control behavior itself. Many animal species, as well as 
human neurological patients and children, show dissociations between what they know in the 
perceptual domain and what knowledge they can use to control action (Hauser 2003; Sterelny 
2003). Perceptual systems differ in the robustness of their tracking (e.g., use of single versus 
multiple perceptual channels to track significant aspects of the environment) and storage of 
information (e.g., knowing what is currently where). Action systems differ in the flexibility or 
response breadth they provide (Sterelny 2003); for example, they may include relatively narrow 
options such as hibernating or storing food, or highly flexible options like cooking and 
preserving food in diverse ways. Organisms may have sophisticated mechanisms to track 
temporal information and yet inflexible action systems, and vice versa. Further, the link between 
the two can be direct, or bottom-up, when perception of a stimulus triggers a response, or they 
can be top-down, mediated by internal representations (i.e., declarative memory). Top-down 
mediation offers the opportunity for representations decoupled from the immediate input to drive 
action flexibly and independently. 
 
2. A taxonomy of future-oriented cognition 
 
Figure 1 shows a widely accepted taxonomy of human memory systems (e.g., Miyashita 2004; 
Squire 1992) and illustrates how this can serve as a basis for a parallel taxonomy of adaptation to 
the future. 
 
Nondeclarative or implicit memory systems are so called because, in humans, their content 
cannot be declared or verbalized (Tulving 1985). They allow stimulus-driven prediction of 
regularities. For example, through association, a conditioned stimulus (e.g., a sound) predicts the 
future arrival of an unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food) and triggers a future-directed response 
(e.g., salivation). In operant conditioning a behavioral response predicts a certain outcome 
(reward). Learning theory has described how organisms use associations to predict the near 
future, and a growing literature is mapping its neurophysiological basis (e.g., O’Doherty 2004; 
Schultz 2006). Nonassociative changes in behavior, such as habituation, also can be understood 
in terms of expectations (e.g., that the situation stays unchanged). All these nondeclarative 
memory systems allow behavior to be modulated by experience such that the organism gains a 
future advantage. We may call the resultant future-directed mechanisms “procedural” because 
flexibility extends only to learning to respond to current indicators of upcoming events. The 
behavior is stimulus-bound, or better, bound to the perceptual tracking of stimuli. 
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Figure 1. Memory and prospection systems. The common taxonomy of memory 
systems (left), after Squire (1992), and its proposed prospective counterpart (right). 
 
 
 
Declarative or explicit memories provide greater flexibility because they can also be voluntarily 
triggered top-down from the frontal lobes, rather than bottom-up through perception (Miyashita 
2004). They may be regarded as decoupled representations that are no longer directly tied to the 
perceptual system. In humans, these memories are conscious and at least partly verbalizable 
(Tulving 1985; 2005). Declarative memory can be subdivided into semantic memory and 
episodic memory. Semantic memory contains general knowledge, allowing learning in one 
context to be voluntarily transferred to another. This capacity provides the basis for inferential 
and analogical reasoning. Semantic memory may thus enable semantic prospection that is 
voluntary and not stimulus-bound. Nevertheless, such prospection is restricted in that it builds on 
a knowledge base that is impervious to particularities of the learning event itself. It is the second 
component of declarative memory, namely, episodic memory, that gives rise to the notion of 
mental time travel. 
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2.1. Toward a definition of mental time travel 
 
Episodic memory, in contrast to semantic memory, provides access to the personally experienced 
event, rather than just the knowledge extracted from the event. The phenomenological 
experience of remembering, or what Tulving (1985) calls autonoetic or self-knowing 
consciousness, such as recollecting where and when one learned that Wellington is the capital of 
New Zealand, is different from merely knowing that fact. This distinction is supported by 
experimental manipulations, imaging studies, and dissociations in impairments following brain 
injury (Gardiner et al. 2002; Henson et al. 1999; Klein et al. 2002b; Tulving 2005). Thus, 
amnesic patients, such as K.C., may know facts (e.g., the difference between stalagmites and 
stalactites) and procedures (e.g., how to play chess), without being able to recall a single 
personally experienced event leading to knowing them (Tulving 2005). Episodic memory is not 
about regularities, but about reconstructing particularities of specific events that have happened 
to the individual. 
 
In effect, then, episodic memory implies a mental reconstruction of some earlier event, including 
at least some of the particularities of that event, such as the principal characters involved, the 
actions that took place, the setting, and the emotional reactions. Metaphorically speaking, it 
might be regarded as the result of a mental journey into the past. This idea is readily extended to 
the future. Based on previous experiences, we can imagine specific events in the future, 
including the sorts of particularities that have characterized events in the past. Mental time travel 
into the future might include the planning of some specific event, such as a dinner party, or it 
might involve the mental anticipation of some event that we know to be scheduled for some 
future date, such as a job interview. Again, though, there is a distinction between merely 
knowing that some event will occur, such as that the sun will set, and mentally creating an event, 
such as a sunset actually experienced, with gradual fading of light, and the blue flash on the 
horizon as the last image of the sun disappears. 
 
The mental reconstruction of past events and construction of future ones may have been 
responsible for the concept of time itself, and the understanding of a continuity between past and 
future. Having a concept of time allows us to understand that past and future are on the same 
dimension, and what was the future eventually becomes the past (that is, unless the universe 
comes to an end). Mental time travel allows us to imagine events at different points along this 
continuum, even at points prior to birth or after death. This means that mental time travel is a 
generative process, incorporating known elements but arranged in particular ways to create the 
experience of events that are actually occurring. Even episodic memory may not be a faithful 
recreation of a past event. False memories have been widely documented (e.g., Loftus & 
Ketcham 1994) and are readily created in the laboratory (e.g., Roediger & McDermott 1995). 
This means that mental time travel cannot be defined in terms of the veracity of the content. We 
know what mental time travel is because we can introspectively observe ourselves doing it and 
because people spend so much time talking about their recollections and anticipations. 
 
A major challenge, though, is to establish a definition, or set of criteria, that might identify 
mental time travel in nonhuman animals that cannot express their experiences in words. This 
problem is akin to the decades-long search for behavioral criteria for theory of mind (see sect. 
4.3) in nonhuman animals (Heyes 1998; Povinelli & Vonk 2003; Premack & Woodruff 1978; 
Suddendorf & Whiten 2003; Tomasello et al. 2005; Whiten & Byrne 1988). Tulving (1972) 
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originally defined episodic memory in terms of the kind of information it appears to store: 
namely, what happened where and when. This is the so-called www criterion; that is, 
demonstrated understanding of what, where, and when might be considered sufficient evidence 
that an imagined event is an instance of mental time travel. For example, if an animal that caches 
food can be considered to demonstrate understanding of what was cached, where it was cached, 
and when it was cached, then it has episodic memory for the caching event itself. Similarly, if its 
behavior indicates specific knowledge of a future event, such as what food it will retrieve, where 
it will find it, and when it will retrieve it, then it may be said to have traveled mentally into the 
future to a retrieval event itself. However, although useful, the www criterion is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for mental time travel. Personal experience, as well as research on false 
memories, show that one can mentally revisit an event without accurate information as to what, 
where, and when, and conversely one can know what, where, and when something happened 
(e.g., one’s birth) without remembering the event itself (Suddendorf & Busby 2003a). Thus, 
Tulving changed his definition to emphasize the phenomenological experience (autonoetic 
consciousness) of episodic retrieval (Tulving 1985; 2005), and www memory in animals has 
been more cautiously termed “episodic-like memory” (Clayton & Dickinson 1998). 
 
Phenomenological experience, though, is a private mental capacity, and one may rightfully 
wonder if one could ever know of another organism’s mental world. It is conceivable that 
neurophysiological criteria may eventually suffice, but there is as yet no agreement as to the 
conditions defining phenomenological awareness, even in humans. Nevertheless, for mental time 
travel to have evolved, there must have been something natural selection could work on, that is, 
some effect on survival or reproduction (unless it was merely an accidental side effect of some 
other adaptation). The answer we propose is that mental time travel provides increased 
behavioral flexibility to act in the present to increase future survival chances (Suddendorf & 
Busby 2003; 2005). For example, one might prepare for a forthcoming job interview based on 
past experiences of interviews, and on imagining the questions one may be asked and on one’s 
possible replies to them. 
 
If this argument is correct, then the crux of mental time travel lies in its role in enhancing 
biological fitness in the future, so that mental time travel into the past is subsidiary to our ability 
to imagine future scenarios. Episodic memory may also inform semantic prospection by, for 
example, providing boundary conditions for the scope of generalizations. Indeed, memories for 
particular contradicting episodes are primed when people retrieve semantic generalizations 
(Klein et al. 2002a). But we argue that the primary role of mental time travel into the past is to 
provide raw material from which to construct and imagine possible futures. In establishing 
whether a given behavior is indicative of mental time travel, then, we should consider 
application of that behavior to the future rather than to the past (Suddendorf & Busby 2005). We 
therefore advance the following description of conditions that, if met, may entitle us to invoke 
the construct of mental time travel to explain it. 
 
Mental time travel is evident in voluntary behavior that solves a problem that the organism will 
encounter at a future point in time, where future entails that the problem is not already manifest 
(e.g., as when acting to satisfy a current hunger). To ascertain that a given behavior was driven 
by mental time travel, it is necessary to rule out chance, innate predispositions, procedural and 
semantic prospection, or any combination of these. We postulate that the crucial selective 
advantage mental time travel provides is flexibility in novel situations and the versatility to 
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develop and adopt strategic long-term plans to suit individual selected goals. Thus, paradigms 
that use transfer tests and cross different domains would be strongest in making cases for mental 
time travel. Such tests provide evidence for mental time travel into the past only by virtue of the 
evidence linking past and future mental time travel, to which we turn next. 
 
2.2. Evidence for continuity of past and future mental time travel 
 
Since past is fact and future is fiction, common sense might suggest that different cognitive 
mechanisms underlie recollection of past events and construction of future ones. There is a 
fundamental causal asymmetry, and one simply cannot know the future as one knows the past. 
However, various lines of evidence suggest that mental time travel into the past shares cognitive 
resources with mental construction of potential future episodes (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). 
Normal adults report a decrease in phenomenological richness of both past and future episodes 
with increased distance from the present (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden 2004). The temporal 
distribution of past events people envisage follows the same power function as the temporal 
distribution of anticipated future events (Spreng & Levine, in press). Amnesic patients who are 
unable to answer simple questions about yesterday’s events have been found to be equally 
unable to say what might happen tomorrow (Klein et al. 2002b; Tulving 1985), and it is not until 
around age 4 that children are able to accurately answer both such questions (Busby & 
Suddendorf 2005). Patients with depression who have trouble retrieving specific memories from 
their past also have trouble imagining specific future episodes (Williams et al. 1996). Finally, 
brain imaging has shown that both remembering the past and imagining the future are associated 
with frontal and temporal lobe activity, although there are specific areas in the frontal pole and 
medial temporal lobes that are more involved with the future than with the past (Okuda et al. 
2003). 
 
The constructions of future and past episodes both depend in part on semantic memory, since 
one must construct events that are consistent with one’s general knowledge of the world. 
Nevertheless it is the episodic component that provides the particularities that can fit one’s future 
plans precisely to the occasion – the seating arrangement, the clothes one might wear, the menu, 
the topics of conversation. In allowing us to foresee unique events, mental time travel offers the 
ultimate step in adaptation to the future. Like human language, it is open-ended and generative, 
so there is no end to the number of potential future scenarios one might envisage. 
 
Although episodic memory preserves something of the particularities of individual events, it is 
often unreliable and subject to distortion, as we have seen. In cases of amnesia, moreover, it is 
episodic memories that are the most vulnerable (Wheeler et al. 1997). The fact that episodic 
memory is fragmentary and fragile suggests that its adaptiveness may derive less from its role as 
an accurate record of personal history than from providing a “vocabulary” from which to 
construct planned future events (and perhaps to embellish events of the past). It may be part of a 
more general toolbox that allowed us to escape from the present and develop foresight 
(Suddendorf & Corballis 1997), and perhaps create a sense of personal identity (Schacter 1996). 
Indeed, our ability to revisit the past may be only a design feature of our ability to conceive of 
the future (Suddendorf & Busby 2003a). 
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2.3. Neurophysiological evidence 
 
We suggested that neurophysiological evidence may eventually serve as a proxy for the 
phenomenology of mental time travel. There is increasing evidence concerning the 
neurophysiology of mental time travel in humans, but little from nonhuman animals. Some of 
this evidence suggests, in fact, that mental time travel may be uniquely human, since the brain 
areas involved have apparently undergone changes that are not evident in other primates. For 
example, the key to mental time travel may lie in part in the expansion of the brain, and the 
prefrontal cortex in particular, in human evolution. Brain size varies between species partly as a 
function of body size, and an appropriate comparative measure is the encephalization quotient 
(EQ), devised by Jerison (1973), which is based on the regression of brain weight on body 
weight. The human EQ is about three times that of the chimpanzee. Further, it has been claimed 
that the increase is larger in the prefrontal cortex, known to be critically involved in episodic 
memory (see review by Wheeler et al. 1997) than in other brain areas (Deacon 1997). Although 
this disproportionate increase has been disputed (e.g., Semendeferi et al. 1997; Uylings 1990), 
Deacon (1997) argued that other studies failed to measure prefrontal cortex independently of 
motor and premotor areas. A more recent study confirms the disproportionate enlargement of the 
prefrontal cortex in humans, but indicates that it is restricted to white matter, and does not apply 
to grey matter (Schoenemann et al. 2005). 
 
Regardless of the question of size, there is also evidence that the prefrontal cortex has been 
substantially reorganized in the course of human evolution. For example, Area 13, which appears 
to be a subdivision of Area 11, is only about half that expected on the basis of brain size, and 
Semendeferi et al. (1998) suggested that this diminution occurs because other regions of Area 
11, along with regions of Area 47, have been enlarged to accommodate a large number of 
specialized subdivisions. The frontal pole is also considerably enlarged relative to that in apes, 
especially in the right hemisphere (Semendeferi et al. 2001). Summarizing this evidence, Flinn et 
al. (2005) suggested that these changes to Area 11 and the right prefrontal cortex appear to be 
involved in “self awareness, social problem solving, the ability to recall personal experiences, 
and the ability to project oneself into the future” (pp. 30–31). 
 
The involvement of the prefrontal cortex may depend on neural loops that also encompass the 
basal ganglia and perhaps other regions as well. In one functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) study, for example, brain activity was recorded while human subjects learned actions in a 
Markov decision task that would bring either immediate or future rewards (Tanaka et al. 2004). 
In both cases significant activity was seen in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and striatum, but for 
actions concerning future rewards, there was additional activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, inferior parietal cortex, dorsal raphe nucleus, and cerebellum. Regression analysis also 
suggested graded maps of time scale within the insula and striatum, with ventroanterior regions 
involved in predicting immediate rewards, and dorsoposterior regions, in predicting future 
rewards. In another study involving appetitive conditioning in humans, fMRI recordings showed 
activity in the orbitofrontal cortex and striatum to be dependent on the time between a present 
conditioned stimulus and an anticipated reward (O’Doherty et al. 2002; see also O’Doherty 
2004). 
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3. Mental time travel in nonhuman animals? 
 
Nonhuman species commonly display behaviors that depend on nondeclarative future-oriented 
systems, and there is strong evidence that they can also deploy semantic memory for future-
directed action. For example, the chimpanzee Panzee declared where food was hidden outside 
her enclosure by touching a lexigram denoting the food and directing a naïve human to it by 
pointing to its location (Menzel 2005). Although this shows that she knew where the food was, it 
does not prove that she remembered the hiding event itself, just as one can know where the car 
keys are without remembering the event of putting them there. The “linguistic” outputs of trained 
apes may demonstrate declarative (i.e., semantic) memory, such as the knowledge of which 
symbols go with which objects or actions, but they do not include reports of travels down 
memory lane. They have not provided evidence of mental time travel. There is so far no use of 
tense, nor any sense that the animals are telling stories about previous or anticipated episodes. In 
marked contrast, human conversation is replete with references to past and planned future 
episodes (e.g., Szagun 1978). 
 
3.1. Mental time travel into the past 
 
Despite our earlier reservations, the www criterion for episodic memory has featured 
prominently in recent comparative research. Though one might expect to find precursors of 
mental time travel in our closest living relatives, the most vigorously argued case has come not 
from apes but from birds that cache food in various locations and later retrieve it. Scrub jays can 
select food locations not only according to the type of food but also according to how long it has 
been stored. For example, they will recover recently cached worms in preference to nuts, since 
fresh worms are more palatable; but if the worms have been cached for too long, they will 
retrieve nuts, because the worms will have decayed and become unpalatable (Clayton et al. 
2003). Scrub jays seem to know what has been cached, where it was cached, and when it was 
cached, thus apparently meeting the www criterion. As noted earlier, however, investigators 
have used the term “episodic-like memory” in acknowledgment that the www criterion need not 
imply true episodic memory, in part because there need not be any implications about autonoetic 
consciousness (Clayton et al. 2003; Emery & Clayton 2004). 
 
When humans talk about past events they typically exchange information about even more w’s, 
such as “who did what to whom, when, where, and why” (Pinker 2003 p. 27). Recent evidence 
indicates that jays may indeed also store information about who observes them cache (Dally 
2006b). The birds were more likely to move the food to new locations if a more dominant bird 
observed the caching than if a less dominant bird did so. The outcome of this recaching behavior 
was presumably a reduction in the likelihood of the food being pilfered in future. 
 
This innovative research program on scrub jays has inspired similar work on other species, with 
varying success (see Table 1 for a summary). Rhesus monkeys, for example, seemed unable to 
learn that a preferred food was available only after a short interval, but not after a long one 
(Hampton et al. 2005), whereas rats were able to learn that a particular arm of a maze contained 
chocolate pellets after a long delay but not after a short delay (Babb & Crystal 2005). 
 
The cases listed in Table 1 explicitly link their results to one of the w’s of episodic-like memory. 
Numerous earlier studies might be included when recategorized in line with this interpretation 
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(e.g., see Schwartz & Evans 2001). No doubt this table will be expanded and altered further as 
more comparative research is conducted with the explicit aim of uncovering evidence for 
episodic-like memory. We believe that this approach may provide one of the first areas in which 
research systematically maps the types of mental content in different species. Although we look 
forward to a more comprehensive table, we remain unconvinced that any of these cases shows 
true mental time travel (Hampton & Schwartz 2004; Roberts 2002; Suddendorf & Busby 2003a). 
 
Suddendorf and Busby (2003a) put forward various reasons why the data from jays and other 
species are not yet conclusive. We noted earlier the distinction between the type of information 
stored and the experience of mentally revisiting an episode that led Tulving to change his 
definition of episodic memory. The information listed in Table 1 may be known rather than 
remembered. There is a difference between remembering having put something somewhere, 
some time ago, and simply knowing right now what is where, and how fresh it is. In fact, 
episodic-like memory may result from feed-forward mechanisms that need not be about the past 
at all. Episode A may cause cognitive change B, which may in turn affect later behavior C, 
without B carrying any information about A itself (Dretske 1982). For example, performance 
that depends on time since an event may rely on the strengths of memory traces, which fade in 
time, and may therefore provide a direct cue without implying mental travel through time. Trace 
strength or some other time-dependent process may act as a clock to determine a “use-by” date 
for consumption. 
 
One argument against this specific idea that www memory may depend on trace strength is that 
rats, at least, still show the effects of trace strength in the accuracy of recognition after 
hippocampal lesions, yet lose the ability to discriminate temporal order (Eichenbaum et al. 
2005), a finding that is also consistent with the hippocampus being a primary site for episodic 
memory in humans. Even so, the hippocampus may be involved in access to trace strength as a 
discriminative cue, so failure to make temporal discriminations after hippocampal damage need 
not rule out the trace-strength hypothesis. Whether or not this specific hypothesis is correct, it 
should be clear that there are viable alternatives to the notion that evidence for www, or even 
wwww, memories is evidence for mental time travel. Indeed, even the original proponents of this 
approach concede that these memories may exist without the jays mentally reconstructing the 
past (Dally et al. 2006b). 
 
A few researchers have tried to tackle the question with different sets of innovative 
methodologies (Zentall 2006). For example Zentall et al. (2001) taught pigeons to press one or 
the other of two new keys depending on whether they had previously responded or not responded 
on another earlier key, suggesting an ability to refer to a previous behavioral episode. Similarly, 
dolphins appear to remember their own previous behavior, as shown by an ability to respond to 
commands equivalent to sentences like “do something not recently done,” or “repeat the most 
recent response” (Mercado et al. 1998). Rats show evidence for temporal order. When exposed 
to sequences of four different odors in distinct locations, rats later showed above-chance 
performance on tests in which they were to choose which of two odors or locations had occurred 
earlier in the sequence (Eichenbaum et al. 2005). However, all of these approaches run into 
problems of interpretation similar to those that afflict the www approach. As we suggested 
earlier and elsewhere (Suddendorf & Busby 2005), the solution may be to focus on future-
directed behavior instead of on episodic memory. We argue that it is action with the future in 
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mind that provides increased selective advantage and is hence visible to evolution. If we are 
right, it might also be visible to clever researchers (if nonhuman animals have it). 
 
Table 1. Recent studies suggesting knowledge of different w information in various 
species that form part of episodic-like memory. 
 
Species What Where When Who Example Studies 
Chimpanzees Yes Yes ? Yes (Menzel 2005) 
Crested 
Gibbons 
Yes Yes ? ? (Scheumann & Call 2006) 
Gorillas Yes Yes ? Yes (Schwartz et al. 2002; Schwartz 
et al. 2005) 
Hummingbirds ? Yes Yes ? (Henderson et al. 2006) 
Mice Yes Yes Yes ? (Dere et al. 2005) 
Orangutans Yes Yes ? ? (Scheumann & Call 2006) 
Rats Yes Yes Yes ? (Babb & Crystal 2005; Eacott et 
al. 2005) 
Rhesus 
monkeys 
Yes Yes No ? (Hampton et al. 2005) 
Scrub jays Yes Yes Yes Yes (Clayton & Dickinson 1998; 
Clayton et al. 2001; Dally et al. 
2006b) 
 
 
3.2. Mental time travel into the future 
 
Animals meet significant recurrent problems such as seasonal food shortages in different ways 
(e.g., migration, torpor, increased fat storage). Caching food is a solution that has evolved among 
some mammals and birds that provision their young (Smith & Reichman, 1984). This strategy 
rests on some memory capacities and suggests orientation to future consumption, but it need not 
imply that the animal actually envisages that future, or even explicitly plans for it. For example, 
one study showed that rats continued to cache food in locations in a maze where food was later 
repeatedly degraded or pilfered, even though they avoided those locations in retrieving the food 
(McKenzie et al. 2005). This suggests that they had little sense of what would happen in the 
future. Similarly, young scrub jays vigorously cache all kinds of objects well before they develop 
the behavior of retrieving them. When caching and retrieval develop in such predictable fashion, 
it appears to be based on instinctive or implicitly learned predispositions that may be modulated 
by semantic memory but need not involve mental time travel (Suddendorf & Busby 2003a). 
 
A possible test of episodic-like prospection might run as follows. The birds would first be taught 
that if they select a cache location under one condition (say, a green light) they will be allowed to 
retrieve from that location at any time, but if they select under another condition (say, a red light) 
they must wait at least a day before being allowed to retrieve. Assuming that they could learn 
this, they are then given the choice of worms or nuts, and the question is whether they would 
select fresh worms when allowed immediate access, but anticipate decayed worms when access 
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is delayed, and so choose nuts. If such anticipation were possible, it might indicate an 
understanding that how long food has been cached projects into the future as well as into the 
past. However, the same difficulties as with episodic-like memory apply. The birds might seem 
to understand the state of the world tomorrow (rotten worms) only through a combination of 
predispositions and specific learning algorithms that have evolved in the caching context (Dally 
et al. 2006b; Suddendorf & Busby 2003a). 
 
Whatever the outcome of such an experiment, adult jays have been shown to modulate caching 
behavior in ways that seem to take the possibility of future pilfering into account. Earlier, we 
alluded to evidence that they recache food if observed by a more dominant bird (Dally et al. 
2006b). Another study has shown that, when observed caching food, jays recache food only if 
they themselves had previously stolen the food of others. Birds with experience of theft seem to 
anticipate a future in which their own food might be stolen, and act accordingly (Emery & 
Clayton 2001). It takes a thief to know a thief. 
 
Prevention of pilfering is a common adaptive problem for species that store food, and various 
strategies have evolved to deal with it (for a review, see Dally et al. 2006a). Both scatter-
hoarders (e.g., ravens) and larder-hoarders (e.g., acorn woodpeckers) may carefully disguise their 
caches or actively defend their stores (e.g., Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2006). Strategies of pilferage 
avoidance are increasingly being documented. For example, eastern grey squirrels space caches 
further apart when conspecifics are present and preferentially dig oriented away from them 
(Leaver et al., in press). Theft is not the only future problem that hoarders may address. Gray 
squirrels bite out the seeds of white oak (but not red oak) acorns before storage, which prevents 
germination (Steele et al. 2001). Treating food before storage (e.g., pine squirrels dry 
mushrooms in the sun) or keeping it alive but unable to escape (e.g. moles biting worms) are 
strategies that reduce spoilage and hence increase future survival chances (e.g., Smith & 
Reichman, 1984).  
 
Are these future-oriented behaviors fundamentally different from nonbehavioral species-specific 
adaptations to the same problem, such as seasonally storing food as blubber or body fat? Perhaps 
not. Advantageous behavior can lead to evolutionary change (Bateson 2004) and can become 
instinctive as descendants of animals displaying the behavior face selection pressure for reliable, 
less resource-intensive shortcuts. New Caledonian crows, for example, manufacture and use 
tools (Hunt 1996). Although there is evidence for social transmission (Hunt & Gray 2003), the 
birds appear to have inherited a predisposition for tool use. They show such behavior without 
any experience or opportunity for observation (Kenward et al. 2005). Adaptations for certain 
types of memory and learning have also been reported in regent honeyeaters. In line with 
ecological factors (i.e., replenishment rates), these birds easily learn to avoid recently rewarding 
food locations and to return after long periods, but do poorly when the contingency is the other 
way around (Burke & Fulham 2003). Though this learning is appropriately future-oriented to the 
contingencies of its habitat, such constraints distinguish it from the flexible future-oriented 
behavior characteristic of human mental time travel. 
 
3.3. The Bischof-Köhler hypothesis 
 
We argued earlier that the selective advantage of mental time travel is the increased flexibility in 
acting in the present to secure future needs. First, therefore, one has to be capable of conceiving 
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having different future needs, such as imagining being thirsty when currently quenched. One 
hypothesis, proposed by Bischof-Köhler (1985) and Bischof (1985), is that it is in fact an 
inability of nonhuman animals to flexibly entertain future need or drive states that limits their 
capacity for mental time travel. That is, nonhuman animals are unable to differentiate future 
states from present ones (Bischof-Köhler 1985; Bischof 1985; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). 
Superficially, at least, this hypothesis cannot be correct, since many species act to secure future 
needs, as illustrated by the caching of food. As noted, though, such behaviors may typically be 
largely instinctive, and experience may only allow changes within specific domain parameters. 
The Bischof-Köhler hypothesis may still apply to more individual, flexible situations involving 
noninstinctive behaviors. One study suggests that children anticipate future needs by around age 
4 (Suddendorf & Busby 2005), and the challenge is now to document its development in more 
detail and to test nonhuman species. 
 
Nonverbal tests of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis have been proposed (Suddendorf 1994; 
Suddendorf & Busby 2005; Tulving 2005) but have yet to be carried out. They involve 
controlling a current need state, such as ensuring that the subject is no longer thirsty, and then 
providing an opportunity to secure a future need, such as obtaining a drink for a future situation 
that will induce thirst. There are various caveats to consider in order to rule out alternative 
explanations based on instinct or associative learning (Suddendorf & Busby 2005). For example, 
instinctual explanations can be ruled out if the experimental scenario does not involve species-
typical behavior, and if similar problems can be solved in a variety of domains. If the same 
animal were to pass variations of such tests across different needs (e.g., hunger, thirst, 
temperature) and contexts (locations, time-intervals), the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis would 
become increasingly untenable. 
 
Mulcahy and Call (2006) recently came closest to implementing such a test. They trained 
bonobos and orangutans to obtain grapes from an apparatus using a tool. Access to the apparatus 
was then blocked, and the animals were presented with a selection of two suitable and six 
unsuitable tools that they could take into a waiting room from where the apparatus was still 
visible. An hour later, they were allowed back into the testing room and given access to the 
apparatus. In 7 out of 16 trials, on average, the apes carried a suitable tool into the waiting room 
and returned with it to obtain grapes an hour later. There were strong individual differences in 
performance, with one orangutan achieving 15 out of 16 correct. This orangutan and the best 
performing bonobo were then tested again, but with an overnight delay between tool selection 
and return. They still returned with a suitable tool in more cases than expected by chance. A third 
experiment showed that the apes could pass the task even when they could not see the apparatus 
during tool selection. The final control study investigated whether the animals merely associated 
the tool with the reward. Subjects again received a grape reward if they returned with the right 
tool but were not actually given an opportunity to use the tool. Performance in this condition was 
poorer, suggesting that they did plan ahead in the other studies (Mulcahy & Call 2006). 
 
Nevertheless there are some concerns about this conclusion (Suddendorf 2006). The same tools 
were appropriate over trials, so apes could have just learned to always return with these same 
tools. This highlights the importance of the final control condition designed to rule out 
explanations based on associations. However, this control condition was not given to the 
successful animals of Experiments 1 to 3, but to a new group of four animals. Two of these never 
brought the tool back (which is not surprising without training or an apparatus) and hence could 
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never have experienced the reward that may have facilitated performance in the previous studies. 
Thus, their data do not inform us about the power of the reward. The other two performed 
identically to two animals in Experiment 1. Thus, contrary to what the authors claimed, 
association cannot be ruled out (Suddendorf 2006). 
 
But even if subsequent studies confirm that great apes can select and keep a different tool for a 
specific future use, it does not show anticipation of future needs as proposed by the Bischof-
Köhler hypothesis. The “future need” potentially anticipated in these studies refers to the “need” 
for a tool to satisfy a current desire for the treat, not anticipation of a different internal drive or 
need state (e.g., such as a future desire that is different from present). The studies did not control 
or manipulate the drive or need state of the subjects, and it is not unreasonable to assume that 
they all had a desire for grape rewards throughout testing (Suddendorf 2006). Animals that are 
not capable of conceiving of future drive and need states would have little reason to concern 
themselves with a remote future, because all they would care about is satisfaction of current 
needs. More research is required to determine the extent of animal foresight, but at present the 
limit proposed by the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis has not been falsified. 
 
We are not making these killjoy arguments because of any preconceived notion about the way 
the world should be. We would be delighted if it could be established that other species have 
mental time travel. It would be a serious challenge to many humans’ anthropocentric worldview 
and would have profound moral implications (Suddendorf & Busby 2003b). Those species that 
can be shown to ponder what has happened, and to speculate about what might happen in the 
future, would require fundamentally different welfare considerations. For example, they would 
suffer not just from current pain but also from revisiting past and anticipating future pain (Lea 
2001). At present, there is no need to abandon the null hypothesis, but neither are we in a 
position to firmly conclude that other animals do not possess this capacity. We admit that a 
substantial body of comparative data is required before it can be concluded that any trait is 
uniquely human (Hauser et al. 2002). 
 
Given the selective importance of future-oriented behavior, species are likely to have evolved a 
wealth of different mechanisms. The growing research interest in the question of animal mental 
time travel may help identify and describe these mechanisms. Our closest surviving relatives, the 
great apes, may be expected to have precursors of the human ability (e.g., foresight limited to 
serving current needs). Mulcahy et al. (2005), for example, have shown that gorillas and 
orangutans can select an appropriate tool in one location to solve a problem at another location 
that was not simultaneously visible. There is a range of evidence that great apes can imagine 
alternative states of the world (see sect. 4.1) and may hence offer a link between animal and 
human minds (for a review, see Suddendorf & Whiten 2001). It is possible, then, that 
antecedents of mental time travel had evolved in the common great ape ancestor. It has been 
argued that living in fission-fusion societies, as modern chimpanzees do, may have selected for 
an increased capacity to monitor across time and space the comings and goings of other group 
members (Barrett et al. 2003). Alternatively, ecological pressures on large arboreal apes, like 
modern orangutans, feeding on spatially and temporally variable food sources (e.g., fruit) might 
have led to selection for increased tracking of these patterns and planning of travel routes in our 
common ancestor. But it remains to be established what exactly the nature and extend of modern 
apes’ foresight (and that of other animals) is. We maintain that the data so far continue to suggest 
that mental time travel is unique to humans. Next we make the case that future research should 
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focus not only on purported instances of mental time travel but also on subsidiary mechanisms 
typical of human mental time travel, which may be necessary to sustain it. 
 
4. Components of human mental time travel 
 
One reason to question whether mental time travel is possible in nonhuman animals is that 
flexible anticipation of particular events is no easy feat, and it may involve a suite of cognitive 
abilities that may not be available to animals or to young children (Suddendorf & Busby 2003a; 
Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). Failures in any one of these may lead to disappointed 
expectations (a source of much human misery and, we may add, many a punch line) or to no 
anticipation at all. To evolve a flexible anticipation system, many cognitive components may 
need to be in place to achieve a level of accuracy that provides a selective advantage sufficient to 
compensate for the enormous expense of cognitive resources. An appropriate metaphor might be 
a theater production, which also requires many subsidiary activities apart from the production 
itself. In the words of Shakespeare, “All the world’s a stage,” and this, we suggest, may include 
the mental world. 
 
In likening mental time travel to a theater production, we are not making any claims about a 
Cartesian theater of the mind, as discussed by Dennett (e.g., 1995), nor about simulation or any 
other mechanisms by which this may be instantiated in the brain. Mental simulation of 
perception and action is of course one way of thinking about conscious thought in general 
(Hesslow 2002) and mental time travel in particular (Suddendorf 1994), but the point here of the 
analogy is simply to draw attention to the range of mental capacities that might be considered 
necessary to engage successfully in mental time travel. We discuss the main theater components 
and their cognitive analogs in the following sections. 
 
4.1. The stage 
 
To entertain a future event one needs imagination – some kind of representational space in our 
mind for the imaginary performance. In cognitive psychology the concept of working memory is 
usually conceived of as such a space (or workbench) where information is temporally combined 
and manipulated (Baddeley 1992). Human working memory appears to comprise, in addition to a 
central executive, two distinct subsystems: a phonological loop and a visuospatial sketchpad. 
Although nonlingual species may not have anything like the inner voice and inner ear (i.e., the 
phonological loop), they may very well have an image-based system (i.e., the visuospatial 
sketchpad). 
 
To represent the future, the stage has to allow combination not only of recently presented 
material but also of information stored in long-term memory. It must allow offline processing. 
Dreaming is an example of offline processing, and mammals appear to have dreams. Offline 
replay during sleep may be involved in consolidation of declarative memories in the 
hippocampus (Kali & Dayan 2004; Wilson & McNaughton 1994). In fact, dreaming or day-
dreaming may be regarded as a form of “scenario building” that social mammals may have 
evolved to allow practice/play without suffering consequences (Alexander 1989). 
 
To make such offline processing, or mental play, directly relevant to situations, however, one 
also has to be able to collate it with perceptions of the present real world. So-called secondary 
  16 
representations are thought to allow just that (Perner 1991; Suddendorf 1999). In addition to a 
primary representation of current reality, a secondary representation of a goal constellation, for 
example, allows an individual to test potential moves by mental rather than physical trial and 
error. This capacity is also evident in pretend play (where one entertains an imaginary world 
while maintaining awareness of the real), Piagetian invisible displacement tests (where one needs 
to reason about an invisible past trajectory of a target), and various other basic cognitive tasks. 
During the second year of life, human children begin to display evidence for secondary 
representation in each of these contexts (Perner 1991; Suddendorf & Whiten 2001). A review of 
the literature found that only our closest relatives, the great apes, have so far provided some 
evidence for secondary representation in all of these areas (Suddendorf & Whiten 2001; 2003; 
Whiten & Suddendorf, in press) and may therefore have the mental stage to imagine past or 
future events. Though convergent evolution may have produced similar skills in other species 
(e.g., corvids, see Emery & Clayton 2004), our own capacity for secondary representation 
appears to have evolved in the common great ape ancestor some 14 million years ago 
(Suddendorf & Whiten 2001). 
 
4.2. The playwright 
 
To generate content, imaginary events need a script or narrative. This requires access to a 
declarative database – that is, stored information that is not stimulus bound, but can be made 
available top-down. As noted earlier, some nonhuman species appear to have declarative 
memory that could serve this function. To generate new content, however, one further needs to 
be able to combine and recombine existing elements. Like language, imaginary narratives may 
operate according to the principle of “discrete infinity” (Hauser et al. 2002), involving the 
recursive application of rules to create an unlimited set of potential future scenarios (Suddendorf 
& Corballis 1997). 
 
Recursion is a computational procedure that calls itself, or calls an equivalent kind of procedure, 
as exemplified in sentences with embedded clauses such as “The malt that the rat ate lay in the 
house that Jack built.” Recursion lies at the heart of grammar, and enables us to create, from a 
finite set of elements, a potential infinity of sentences that convey a potential infinity of 
meanings. Recursion may also be said to underlie other aspects of human thought, including 
perhaps music, manufacture, navigation, social relationships, and numbering systems (Corballis 
1991; Hauser et al. 2002). Theory of mind, which is the understanding that others have beliefs, 
desires, or intentions, for example, can involve several levels of recursion, as in such 
propositions as I think that you think I think you’re stupid, which involves double recursion. 
Counting, as distinct from subitization or number estimation, involves principles that can be used 
recursively, enabling us to enumerate indefinitely. We humans, at least, use the concept of time 
in recursive ways, as in our understanding of such sentences like “Next Thursday he will have 
arrived in Mexico.” The future perfect is but one of some 30 different tenses in English and 
reflects the close relation between language and mental time travel. Children begin to show a 
recursive, generative capacity in the early preschool years. 
 
There is as yet little if any evidence for recursion in any nonhuman species (Corballis 2003). 
Many birds sing songs of considerable complexity, and individual birds may have repertoires of 
many songs, involving different sequences of notes, but individual songs tend to be fixed and are 
repeated with remarkable consistency (e.g., Kroodsma & Momose 1991). There has been at least 
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one claim that birds can generate songs using grammatical principles: Hailman and Ficken 
(1986) reported that the songs of chickadees follow rules governing the selection and sequencing 
of notes, but those rules appear to conform to a simple finite-state grammar rather than a context-
free grammar like that underlying human language (Corballis 1991, p. 140). There is no evidence 
of recursion. 
 
A recent claim that starlings can learn to recognize recursive patterns of sounds (Gentner et al. 
2006) is, in our opinion, without foundation. The experimenters generated recursive sequences of 
up to eight sounds by embedding pairs of sounds, each consisting of a rattle and a warble, into 
another pair in recursive fashion. For example, if Ai denotes a rattle and Bi a warble, two levels 
of embedding would create the sequence A3(A2(A1B1)B2)B3. Exact sequences were seldom 
repeated, since the actual sounds were randomly selected from a population of eight rattles and 
eight warbles. The birds were able to discriminate sequences based on this recursive embedding 
from sequences not obeying the rule. This need not mean, though, that they understood 
recursion, since each sequence could be regarded as simply comprising a sequence of rattles 
followed by a sequence of warbles (e.g., A3A2A1 followed by B1B2B3). That is, the birds may 
simply have established the number of sequential rattles and the number of sequential rattles, and 
responded positively if the two were equal. Number perception for auditory sequences in birds 
may actually surpass that in humans (Thompson 1969), so a strategy of “estimate-and-match” 
may well have been within the capacity of the starlings. An earlier study showed that tamarins 
were unable to perform an analogous discrimination task (Fitch & Hauser 2004), but even if they 
had been able make the discrimination, it need not have implied that they recognized recursion 
itself (see Corballis, in press, for more detailed discussion). 
 
4.3. The actors 
 
Events typically involve characters, and mental time travel might well have evolved to predict 
(and aid or thwart) the behaviors of others (discussed later in this section). To represent self and 
others realistically requires declarative knowledge of individuals and some folk psychology (i.e., 
theory of mind) to predict how they act (e.g., knowing that they typically act on the basis of their 
beliefs to fulfill their desires). With such knowledge, one can engage in more sophisticated social 
competition and cooperation, and one of the most effective ways to do so is to act like an actor: 
“to see ourselves as others see us, so as to cause them to see us as we would like them to rather 
than as they would like to” (Alexander 1989, p. 491). Self-awareness is difficult to define and 
measure. Alexander (1989) argued that one important aspect of self-awareness springs directly 
from an ability to consider one’s self in various alternative versions of future events. This is the 
notion of “free will,” implying that one can deliberately choose to pursue one of several 
entertained paths. 
 
It is established that great apes, like 2-year-old children and unlike many other animals tested, 
can at least recognize themselves in mirrors (e.g., Bard et al. 2006; Gallup 1970; Patterson & 
Cohen 1994; Suarez & Gallup 1981). They have an expectation of what they look like from the 
outside, and this expectation is rapidly updatable (Nielsen et al. 2006). Together with evidence 
for some understanding of what others can see (Call et al. 1998; Hare et al. 2000) or did see 
(Hare et al. 2001), this strongly suggests that they can “see themselves as others see them” at 
least in the literal sense. But it is not so clear whether they care about manipulating how others 
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see them (even in this literal sense, only humans regularly adorn themselves with jewelry and 
clothes). 
 
Nevertheless, there is a sizable body of evidence to suggest that primates do engage in various 
forms of tactical deception in social interactions (Whiten & Byrne 1988). Primate social 
knowledge is impressive. Many primates recognize other individuals, as well as their social rank 
and relations (Seyfarth et al. 2005). Great apes and 2-year-old children also appear to have some 
limited folk psychology, but the precise nature of their capacities remains to be established (e.g., 
Suddendorf & Whiten 2003; Tomasello et al. 2003). Currently, the available data suggest that 
they do not have a representational theory of mind including the capacity to metarepresent that 
others may hold representations contradicting their own (Call 2001; Whiten & Suddendorf 
2001). It is only between ages 3 and 4 that humans pass tests (e.g., false-belief tasks) that 
demonstrate such understanding (e.g., Perner 1991; Wellman et al. 2001). We have argued that it 
may require this level of folk psychology to be able to identify with one’s future self, understand 
that this future self may have mental states that differ from one’s current states, and care about 
them (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). As Hazlitt (1805) observed: “The imagination … must 
carry me out of myself into the feelings of others by one and the same process by which I am 
thrown forward as it were into my future being, and interested in it” (p. 1). 
 
4.4. The set 
 
The mental play also needs a physical context that operates according to real-world principles. 
This requires some “folk physics.” Although one prominent researcher recently concluded that 
not even apes can mentally represent unobservable causal factors such as gravity and force 
(Povinelli 2000), many other researchers are not convinced that their folk physics is quite so 
limited (Allen 2002; Hauser 2001; Whiten 2001). Chimpanzees, for example, have passed 
double invisible displacement (object-permanence) tasks that require reasoning about the 
movement of objects that are no longer perceptible (Collier-Baker & Suddendorf 2006). 
 
Especially important to mental time travel is some appreciation of the time dimension itself. 
Some fundamental timing processes (e.g., circadian rhythms) that link behavior to regular 
environmental changes are clearly widespread in the animal kingdom and are fairly well 
understood (e.g., Albrecht & Eichele 2003). Other, more cognitive processes are less well 
understood. There appear to be various different timing mechanisms in the human brain that 
track key information about temporal distance, order, and location within time patterns and 
humans appear to draw on different combinations of those (Friedman 2005). 
 
Proposals for time measurement mechanisms range from discrete accumulating neural 
pacemakers (e.g., in scalar expectancy theory) to models involving continuous decay strength of 
memory traces. As noted earlier, fading of memory may itself provide temporal information that 
could account for the when component of www memory in scrub jays. In humans, cognitively 
controlled, rather than automatic, tracking of the passage of time typically activates the right 
hemispheric dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an area also implicated in working memory (Lewis & 
Miall 2006). Lewis and Miall argued that both working memory and judging temporal distance 
may depend on the same dopamine-modulated neuronal system. Children begin to accurately 
discriminate distances of past events from around age 4 onward (Friedman & Kemp 1998). 
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Mental time travel may itself make such timing based on memory-decay functions less reliable. 
Since mentally constructing and reconstructing episodes reactivates memory traces, it may 
strengthen these memory traces and make them appear to be “fresher” in memory than warranted 
by age alone. Other timing mechanisms may therefore have evolved for the construction of a 
more accurate chronology.  Indeed, chronology appears not to be a basic property of human 
memory but rather depends on active repeated construction (Friedman 1993). Some information 
about the order in which events occurred (e.g., before and after) may, however, be stored in 
memory. As we saw earlier, even rats show evidence of tracking temporal order (Eichenbaum et 
al. 2005). 
 
How internal clocks, order codes, or other processes give rise to adult human concepts of the 
time dimension remains unclear. Human cultures have developed different semantic 
representations of time patterns (e.g., hours, days, weeks, months) that enable people to locate 
the time of events. Actively reconstructing locations of events in such explicit time patterns is 
probably the most common human approach to timing (Friedman 1993). Location-based 
processes are evident in scale effects where judgment of time of day of a past event may be more 
accurate than judgment of the month in which the event occurred – distance-based mechanisms 
cannot explain such phenomena. Friedman (2005) recently reviewed the evidence and concluded 
that humans use both verbal and image-based processes to reason about the temporal location of 
events and that children use image codes to differentiate daily events by around age 5, and verbal 
lists, such as days of the week, by age 7. Children’s relatively late acquisition of cultural time 
concepts suggests that they are not easy to acquire. 
 
Once established, such time patterns offer the opportunity to place future events at particular 
points in time. Of course, neither order codes nor distance information in memory can explain 
the development of a temporally differentiated sense of the future. Children begin to show a 
rough temporal differentiation of future events by around age 5 (for a recent review, see 
Friedman 2005). Nonhuman animals seem severely limited in learning temporal information, and 
performance appears to be based on nondeclarative mechanisms rather than any such explicit 
concepts of time (Roberts 2002). Nonetheless, the work on scrub jays reviewed earlier suggests 
temporal-tracking mechanisms more sophisticated than previously thought to exist in any 
nonhuman species. 
 
4.5. The director 
 
Mental time travel is of course not to be mistaken for clairvoyance. The future contains many 
possibilities, and hence mental time travel involves entertaining different versions of scenarios 
and evaluating their likelihood and desirability. Like a director trying out alternative ways of 
presenting a scene, effective mental time travel requires rehearsals and evaluations. This entails 
some level of dissociation and metacognition (i.e., thinking about thinking), which first emerges 
in children around age 4 (Perner 1991; Suddendorf 1999; Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). There 
is at best limited evidence for very basic metacognitive capacities in nonhuman animals 
(Hampton 2001; Shettleworth & Sutton 2006). 
 
In studies involving extensive training on a simple task, such as determining which of two 
stimuli is the larger, some monkeys given the option of not taking a trial eventually learn to 
avoid trials they are likely to fail (Smith et al. 2003; Son & Kornell 2005). Such uncertainty 
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monitoring arguably implies metacognition, in that the monkeys may know that they do not 
know, and may even imply self-reflective consciousness. However, Son and Kornell conceded 
that their results need not mean that monkeys are aware of their judgments. It remains unclear to 
us how any such performance is “meta” over and above other undisputable and common 
confidence judgments that animals may hold about their own ability. For example, judging how 
far it can jump is surely essential for any monkey traversing the canopy. The nature of what is 
supposed to be (meta) represented may play a role in comparative cognition. Great apes have 
shown some signs of competence in regard to basic mental states. Call and colleagues (Call 
2004; Call & Carpenter 2001), for example, recently provided some evidence that great apes 
know something about what they have or have not seen, as reflected in whether they do or do not 
seek further information before acting. But Call (2005) noted that it is not known whether any 
nonhuman species attribute more complex states such as knowledge or beliefs to themselves. 
 
A key role of a director is to orchestrate rehearsals. Humans rehearse significant future events 
and practice their own performance not only in their minds but also in action. In fact, this trait 
would seem essential to any account of the enormous diversity of human expertise. Humans 
choose to learn and practice things they want to get better at. A function of play in many species 
may be that it prepares the young for the future (e.g., fighting skills). However, unlike species-
typical play, humans choose what to practice and often do so in anticipation of specific future 
events (e.g., rehearsal for a theater performance). We know of no evidence that nonhuman 
animals deliberately practice for specific anticipated events (Suddendorf & Busby 2003a). 
 
4.6. The executive producer 
 
Enacting a planned event requires voluntary control, including executive functions such as the 
ability to inhibit other stimulus-driven responses in favor of one that suits the anticipated events 
best. Impaired mental time travel capacity following frontal-lobe damage has been associated 
with impairment of such self-regulation (Levine 2004). Even inhibiting a simple response in 
order to increase one’s total future reward is a difficult task for young children, as research on 
delay of gratification amply illustrates (Mischel & Mischel 1983; Moore et al. 1998). Adult 
humans, on the other hand, regularly forego instant rewards because of a multitude of anticipated 
long-term gains (e.g., weight loss, longevity, afterlife). 
 
To override current drives in favor of acting to secure some anticipated future outcome, it would 
help to overestimate the positive or negative effects of future reward or punishment. In fact, 
humans show a systematic bias toward overestimating the intensity of future affective responses 
to future events (e.g., the dreaded interview with the bank manager often turns out to be more 
benign than expected). The nature of this biased “affective forecasting” is currently a topic of 
investigation in social psychology (e.g., Gilbert 2006; Wilson & Gilbert 2005). Accurately 
anticipating one’s own future mental states is no easy feat and is often influenced by one’s 
current states, which is why one buys more treats when shopping while hungry (Gilbert et al. 
2002). Even children show this effect (Atance & Meltzoff 2006). 
 
Plans further require prospective memory – remembering to perform a future action at the 
appropriate time. Purported evidence for prospective memory in nonhuman animals has been 
disputed (Thorpe et al. 2004). Executive control may be required not only to implement strategic 
action plans but also to manage the motivational and goal system itself (Conway et al. 2004; 
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Suddendorf & Busby 2005). For mental time travel to become the flexible and effective future-
oriented strategy that it is, cognition had to truly take the driver’s seat of behavior (Suddendorf 
1999). Modern humans often juggle a multitude of different goals and must decide when to do 
what to achieve which aims. The development of these sophisticated, resource-intensive, and 
error-prone mechanisms continues well into adulthood, and we know of no evidence for a 
comparable capacity in nonhuman animals. 
 
4.7. The broadcaster 
 
Finally, temporally displaced events are not only entertained in private but also are often 
communicated. A play is not just a metaphor for mental time travel, it is often also a public 
expression of it. More generally, humans use language to exchange and complement their mental 
travels into the past and their ideas about future events, as well as to cooperatively coordinate 
plans and strategies (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). There is as yet no evidence that nonhuman 
animals communicate such mental travels. Such communication does not require language, as 
pantomime and dance can demonstrate. Chimpanzees appear to have some capacity to imitate 
(Whiten 1998) and to recognize when someone else is copying them (Nielsen et al. 2005). 
Animals with such abilities might in principle also be able to reenact past episodes, using mime, 
if they wanted to communicate those to others. 
 
Although language is not necessary for mental time travel, it provides the clearest evidence of it. 
Indeed, it may not be too far-fetched to suppose that mental time travel was a prerequisite to the 
evolution of language itself, since, as we saw earlier, language is exquisitely equipped to express 
events that are distant in both space and time from the present. If we are correct in supposing that 
mental time travel is uniquely human, then this may explain why language itself is unique to our 
species, at least in the strong sense defined by Hauser et al. (2002). The adaptive utility of the 
capacity to transcend the present in an open-ended, flexible manner may have driven these same 
properties in language (for a discussion, see Corballis & Suddendorf, in press). 
 
4.8 Components of successful mental time travel 
In summary, the theatre metaphor implies that mental time travel requires a constellation of skills 
and is not simply an isolated capacity. Adult humans may fail to act now for a particular future 
event because of a deficiency in any one of these components (e.g., one may fail to predict one’s 
own future mental states, or one may fail to override more immediate impulses). Young children 
may also fail to do so because one or the other of these components is not yet fully developed. 
Further study of how these requisite capacities emerge in human development may hold clues to 
the relationship between them. 
 
Some of the foundations, such as imagination, self-recognition, and semantic memory, begin to 
emerge early in childhood. Whereas other capacities, like recursive thought and representational 
theory of mind, develop first in children between ages 3 and 4. It is around this time that 
unequivocal evidence for episodic memory emerges, childhood amnesia ceases, and implicated 
prefrontal regions mature (e.g., Levine 2004). Between ages 3 and 5, children start to reason 
about future and past states (Atance & Meltzoff 2005; Gopnik & Slaughter 1991; Suddendorf & 
Busby 2005), make plans (Atance & O’Neill 2005; Hudson et al. 1995), delay gratification 
(Mischel & Mischel 1983; Thompson et al. 1997), accurately report events of yesterday and 
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tomorrow (Busby & Suddendorf 2005; Harner 1975), and temporally differentiate events in the 
past (Friedman & Kemp 1998) and in the future (Friedman 2000). 
 
Nonhuman animals may also be limited because of deficiencies in any of these components. 
Although there is evidence in some species (especially from our closest relatives) for basic 
components, such as imagination and self-recognition, support for most others is very slim. 
Should a component be present only weakly, if at all, in other species, mental time travel would 
be severely limited, at best. For example, without a representational theory of mind, foresight 
might be restricted to serving satisfaction of current needs, as the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis 
proposes. Our suggestion, then, is that when studying the possibility of mental time travel in 
other species, the research agenda should include work on these components to human mental 
time travel. Determining to what extent specific components are necessary and sufficient for 
what aspects of foresight to emerge will be an important task.    
  
5. Some qualifications 
 
Our theatre metaphor and our reference to constructing particular events, as well as the notion of 
www memory, have connotations that may be misleading. We are not suggesting that humans 
typically re- or preconstruct full-fledged episodes that are played out like a video recording. As 
pointed out earlier, episodes are actively constructed and are prone to error. Also, mental time 
travel often involves only the smallest snippets of events. In fact, the snippets do not have to 
come from the same place and time; snippets from very different times can be strung together. 
That is, humans can relate events from different times and identify patterns that help us make 
sense of the present (e.g., “he did X, and then two days later Y, only to now do Z”) and to predict 
the future (e.g., “I am going to do A tomorrow which will deal with his action Y, so I can 
achieve B next week”).  
 
Rats, on the other hand, even after thousands of trials fail to learn the link between a stimulus 
and a reward if they are a few seconds apart, and there is no secondary reinforcer (Grice 1946, 
cited in Roberts 2002). Relating events across time may be one of the key advantages provided 
by mental time travel into the past, as it offers humans additional information for prediction of 
events to follow. In other species, solutions to the need to bridge temporally distant events are 
typically highly specific and lack the flexibility of mental time travel. Whereas most learning 
links events that occur within a few seconds of each other, rats famously can link taste with 
nausea even when the illness develops hours after consumption (Etscorn & Stephens 1973; 
Garcia et al. 1966). This linkage, however, appears to be highly specific, and is limited to the 
linking of sickness to taste, and not to auditory or visual stimuli (Garcia & Koelling 1966). This 
temporally extended learning mechanism thus appears to have evolved in response to a recurring 
problem with strong selective force (those who eat too much of the wrong food die). Humans 
appear to be less constrained and can (though may not) link virtually anything to anything else 
across time. 
 
Although we have highlighted the similarities between mental time travel past and future, there 
are of course also some notable differences. Obviously, the past has in fact happened, whereas 
the future harbors a lot more uncertainty. For example, the weather may change, or the car may 
break down. Another potential difference lies in the temporal distribution of the number of 
events people recall and anticipate. Although there are similarities in the distributions (Spreng & 
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Levine, in press), the past features the so-called reminiscence bump – by the age of around 70, 
for example, people tend to recall more events from their 20s than events from their 40s and 50s 
(Rubin & Schulkind 1997). Our view of mental time travel may provide an answer as to why that 
may be so. If the key function of mental time travel into the past is indeed to inform and allow 
the anticipation of the future, then it is in the formative years that people have to retain as much 
event detail as possible in order to abstract facts and make specific predictions. Accumulating a 
vast pool of episodes of varied experiences provides one with an arsenal of information for 
future prediction. 
 
As one matures, one also accumulates more semantic facts, and fewer things are surprising. 
Predictions can increasingly be made by abstract rules (i.e., using semantic prospection) rather 
than through imagination of individual future events. Retaining details of individual events 
becomes less important the more over-arching principles have been deduced. Good prediction 
depends on the right balance of semantic and episodic information, so that one does not get 
bogged down in too much episodic clutter (e.g., Anderson & Schooler 1991). Episodic memory 
may decline as a consequence of the increase in the extraction of facts and rules, or what some 
would call crystallized intelligence. Thus, although we have argued that semantic memory and 
prospection are phylogenetically older than episodic memory and prospection, mental time travel 
may vastly increase the nature and capacity of semantic future-oriented cognition. Just as 
semantic and episodic memory interact (Tulving 2005), so may semantic and episodic 
prospection. 
 
6. Evolutionary considerations 
 
Because behavior that increases future survival has a selective advantage, mechanisms for 
future-directed behavior are ubiquitous. The now-standard taxonomy of human memory, we 
suggest, can be extended to incorporate variations in the degree of flexibility each system 
provides for the future. Mental time travel offers the ultimate level of flexibility, allowing 
voluntary anticipation of any particular event. This foresight requires several sophisticated 
cognitive abilities, is resource-intensive and error-prone, and introduces new kinds of mental 
stress, not least of which is the knowledge of inevitable death. 
 
This is a high price to pay for a system for anticipating the future, which of course can never be 
known with perfect precision, especially considering the fact that much can be achieved with 
simpler prospection systems (instincts, procedural and semantic prospection). But mental time 
travel offers an additional degree of flexibility that, even if the adaptive advantage was in the 
first instance small, was sufficient to ensure selection and fixation in the population. Haldane 
(1927) computed that a variant resulting in a mere 1% in fitness would increase in population 
frequency from 0.1% to 99.9% in just over 4,000 generations, a time span that fits easily into 
hominin evolution, or even into the evolution of our own genus, Homo. Even if the initial 
adaptive advantage may have been small, it is clear that today humans base much of their actions 
on anticipation of future events, from preparing this weekend’s escape to building wealth. 
 
The immense flexibility it provides may have allowed us to successfully adapt to and colonize 
most habitats on the planet (Suddendorf & Busby 2005). Our future-directed behavior can even 
go beyond merely individual needs and may carry a concern for the planet itself, along with its 
inhabitants. That concern may also extend beyond the life span of the individual. As perhaps the 
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only species with such foresight, humans alone may be driven to consciously guide the planet 
into the future (Dawkins 2000) and thus be burdened with the responsibility of getting it right. 
We can identify future threats to our world, be they of our own doing (e.g., the consequences of 
human-induced global warming) or of external origin (e.g., an asteroid on collision course with 
Earth). Humans can forecast the outcomes and choose to act now to secure future needs. Cultures 
have evolved complex moral systems that judge actions as right or wrong partly based on what 
the actor could or could not have reasonably foreseen to be the future consequences of the act. 
Law, education, religion, and many other fundamental aspects of human culture are deeply 
depended on our shared ability to reconstruct past and imagine future events. 
 
So why might humans, but not other animals, have the capacity for mental time travel? Are there 
plausible accounts as to how it may have evolved since the split from the last common ancestor 
of Homo and Pan some 5 or 6 million years ago? The possibility of a gap between the human 
and animal mind need not contradict Darwinian principles of natural selection. With the global 
shift to cooler climate after 2.5 million years ago, much of southern and eastern Africa probably 
became more open and sparsely wooded, exposing the hominins to greater danger from predators 
and forcing them into a “cognitive niche” (Tooby & DeVore 1987), with heavy reliance on 
social cooperation and communication for survival. With the emergence of the genus Homo, 
brain size increased rapidly from around 2 million years ago (Wood & Collard 1999), possibly 
reflecting selection for such interrelated attributes as theory of mind, language, and, we propose, 
mental time travel. 
 
The earliest hard evidence, quite literally, for foresight comprises stone tools that appear to have 
been transported for repeated use. Reconstruction of knapping routines (using refit data) suggests 
that at least by the Middle Pleistocene hominins produced stone tools in one site to use them later 
at another (Hallos 2005). Bipedal hominins in the deforested savannah may have relied 
increasingly on throwing stones at predators (e.g., Calvin 1982), as well as using them to bring 
down prey and cut up carcasses. Great apes do hurl objects, but with little precision. Carrying 
rocks for use as missiles at some future point may have been vital, and a capacity to plan for this 
might have been strongly selected for. By 400,000 years ago some hominins had clearly 
developed aimed throwing, as revealed by wooden spears uncovered in Germany together with 
butchered horses (Thieme 1997). One possibility, then, is that extensive foresight evolved first in 
the context of throwing, as hominins faced different predators and prey in the savannah than they 
did in the trees. Osvath and Gardenfors (2005), for example, marshal evidence for such a 
scenario leading from the Oldowan tool culture to the evolution of mental time travel. 
 
Similar arguments could be made for other ways in which hominins may have first adapted their 
environment to suit their future needs. The fact that stone tools provide us with an archaeological 
record that other behaviors do not may skew our evaluation of their significance. Consider, for 
example, the use of fire, which is also evident by 400,000 years ago (e.g., Boaz et al. 2004) and 
may well have been used much earlier. Although it is difficult to identify archaeological 
evidence for mastery of fire, one needs little imagination to envisage the huge selective 
advantage that it might have bestowed, in defense, attack, cooking, provision of warmth, night-
time vision, and so on. Planning capacities could have been selected for as the incidental use of 
fire gave way to maintenance of fire and finally to the making of fire for more controlled and 
deliberate purposes. Perhaps the ancient Greeks were right: They believed that Prometheus stole 
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fire from heaven to give humans the powers of the gods that set them apart from animals – 
Prometheus means foresight. 
 
Yet, these victories in gaining control of the natural world may only have been side effects of a 
quite different evolutionary arms race. Technological advances may have been secondary to 
abilities that evolved primarily in the social arena. Modern humans certainly use their planning 
capacities extensively to cooperate with, deceive, and manipulate conspecifics. As noted earlier, 
much of what humans recall and foresee has to do with “who did what to whom, when, where, 
and why” (Pinker 2003, p. 27). It has been suggested that social rather than ecological pressures 
drove the evolution of intelligence, not only in humans but in primates more generally 
(Humphrey 1976). This hypothesis has attracted some strong support in recent years (e.g., 
Dunbar 2003; Seyfarth et al. 2005; Whiten & Byrne 1988). 
 
One problem for such an account is to explain why the cognitive arms race seems to have 
persisted longer in humans than in other primates, resulting in apparently unique cognitive skills, 
including, perhaps, mental time travel. A potential explanation, suggested by Alexander and 
colleagues (Alexander 1989; Flinn et al. 2005), is that once early hominins obtained a certain 
level of “ecological dominance,” perhaps partly through technological advances as discussed 
earlier, they were faced with increased competition from their own species – “humans uniquely 
became their own principal hostile force of nature” (Alexander 1989). This may have resulted in 
a runaway social competition between (and within) groups toward greater intelligence and 
enhanced abilities for both cooperation and deception. These may have included the ability to 
entertain alternative future scenarios (mental time travel), to read others’ minds (theory of mind), 
and to communicate (language). 
 
This “coalitionary arms race” (Flinn et al. 2005) also offers an answer to one of the greatest 
mysteries of human evolution: Why have all the other hominin species become extinct? One 
only needs to extend the proposal from intraspecies competition to intragenus competition to see 
a solution. Our ancestors may have competed with an array of other bipedal species that once 
graced this planet and perhaps simply outsmarted them, contributing to their demise (Suddendorf 
2004). One of the final steps that may have given us a decisive edge over the last nonhuman 
hominins, the Neanderthals, may have been autonomous speech (Corballis 2004). This 
suggestion that humans played a role in displacing other hominins is in line with recorded human 
history in that human groups perpetually compete with each other and often violently displace 
other groups, as well as with various other human characteristics, such as our unique obsessions 
with intergroup competitive play (e.g., sports). This intragenus competition may have ultimately 
been won by human groups because of continued advances in foresight, language, culture and 
coordinated aggression, leaving us as the sole survivors of an extraordinary evolutionary arms 
race. We may be the only species capable of mental time travel because the others competing in 
our niche have become (or have been made) extinct. 
 
Like the “just-so stories” about throwing or fire, an account emphasizing intraspecies or 
intragenus competition may exaggerate the importance of a single factor. Claiming that the 
hostile forces of nature turned into “relative trivialities” (Alexander 1989) probably 
underestimates the selective pressure of catastrophic environmental changes such as ice ages, 
volcanic eruptions, and meteorite impacts on life in general. Such events may well have 
produced bottlenecks in evolutionary history where social competition was of far less import 
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than ecological factors and cooperation. Rather than endorsing one or the other scenario, we 
present them here merely to make the point that plausible accounts exist that can explain why 
humans may have capacities, such as mental time travel, that other species do not have. 
Darwinian continuity need not demand greater mental powers in nonhuman animals than is 
currently evident. 
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